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Finance practitioners frequently claim that stocks of Korean firms are undervalued and trade at 
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The Korea discount and chaebols 
 
1. Introduction 
 Finance practitioners frequently claim that stocks of Korean firms are undervalued and 
trade at a discount relatively to comparable foreign firms. They call this phenomenon "the 
Korea discount". This term first appeared in Korea in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis but quickly became global when Korea opened its stock market to foreign investors at the 
turn of the century as this increased the general interest for this market.1 The Korea discount 
refers to a lower price-earnings (PE) ratio of Korean stocks relative to their global peers (OECD, 
2018, p. 75). The evidence on the existence of this discount is obtained either by comparing the 
level of the PE ratio of a Korean market index (e. g. Noble, 2010) with the PE ratio of an 
international index or the PE ratio of some Korean firms (e. g. WSJ, 2007) with the PE ratio of 
foreign peers. However, these comparisons offer only anecdotal evidence and a systematic 
analysis is necessary to be able to conclude that Korean stocks really trade at a discount. 
Surprisingly, despite the interest of practitioners and its recurrence in the financial press, this 
question has not been addressed in the academic literature so far. Our paper fills this gap and 
provides a detailed empirical research on a large sample of international stocks over the period 
2002-2016. We report the presence of a significant discount over this period. Korean stocks 
have PE ratios that are, on average, lower by 30% than their foreign peers. 
 Our analysis uses firm-level data and includes firms from 28 countries for the period 
2002-2016. The total sample contains 25,863 unique firms and 162,495 firm-year observations. 
We measure the presence of the Korea discount using three different approaches. Two of them 
aggregate stocks into portfolios and provide results that are comparable to the index-based 
anecdotal evidence. A third approach is based on individual stocks. The latter offers a finer 
view on the presence of the discount as the grouping of stocks into portfolios can eventually 
hide some differences in valuation ratios. It also offers the possibility to control for firm specific 
parameters. The results of all three approaches converge in terms of both forward and trailing 
earnings valuation ratios and document the presence of a significant discount for Korean stocks. 
In addition to providing a statistical support to practitioner observations, our approach also 
allows us to document the evolution of the discount over time as well as with respect to different 
 
1 The 1997 Asian crisis and international bail-out of Korea forced the country to reform corporates and financial 
markets. Since 1998, most of restriction on foreign equity investment have been removed (Eichengreen et al., 
2015, p. 100). 
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reference countries. We notably find that there is a decline of the Korea discount over time. Our 
results also suggest that the Korea discount is a pervasive phenomenon that affects most Korean 
industries relative to their foreign counterparts, no matter if these foreign firms are from 
emerging or developed markets  
 The financial press and analysts of the Korean market offer different potential 
explanations for the presence of the discount. These include tensions with North Korea, social 
and political risks, or poor corporate governance. However, numerous observers attribute the 
main cause of the discount to the presence of chaebols (The Economist, 2012; OECD, 2018, p. 
75). A second objective of this paper is to investigate the role played by these large business 
groups in the Korean discount. Chaebols are often criticized for their poor governance and the 
misbehavior of their controlling families (The Economist, 2012; Choi et al., 2018). The 
governance and risk of expropriation might cause the discount observed at a market level if 
investors discount firms affiliated to a chaebol for these reasons. If this explanation is valid, we 
should only observe a discount for firms affiliated to a chaebol. Our results do not support this 
hypothesis since both chaebol and non-chaebol firms exhibit a significant discount. Moreover, 
we find that firms affiliated to a chaebol have a lower discount than other Korean firms. This 
could be due to the gain in international reputation and visibility of some chaebol firms which 
may have led investors to consider affiliated firms differently from less known Korean firms. 
This result is also consistent with an alternative explanation, less discussed in the context of the 
Korea discount, which is related to the substantial economic power that chaebols have 
accumulated over time. Indeed, policymakers and international organizations point out the 
negative effect of the dominance of chaebols on competition and competitiveness of other firms 
typically small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and startups (OECD, 2018, p. 74). The 
lower valuations of non-affiliated firms could therefore simply reflect the fact that these firms 
are harmed by the presence of chaebols. 
 The paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, the paper identifies 
and documents extensively the presence of the Korea discount at the market, industry and 
individual firm levels. This is an important issue for Korean financial markets that has not been 
addressed previously in the academic literature. Second, we analyze the role played by chaebols 
in the discount and find that they are not directly responsible for the lower valuation of Korean 
stocks. Their role seems to be different from what most observers expect.  
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and the 
different variables used in the analysis while Section 3 provides empirical results documenting 
the presence of the Korea discount using different approaches. Section 4 investigates the role 
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played by chaebols in the valuation of Korean firms. Section 5 summarizes the major findings 
and concludes the paper. 
 
2. Data 
 This study uses firm-level data to provide a detailed analysis of the Korea discount. We 
obtain data from three sources: Thomson Reuters Datastream (Datastream), Worldscope, and 
I\B\E\S. As Karolyi and Kim (2017), we use a number of filters on Datastream to build our 
sample.2 Our final sample includes publicly listed firms from 28 markets3 covering all 
continents and both emerging and developed markets. For different tests, countries are also 
grouped in three geographical areas: Asia-Pacific, emerging markets, and developed markets 
(based on MSCI classification). Note that Korea is excluded from sub-samples to avoid 
overlapping issues. We use these three groups of countries to estimate the Korea discount to 
check the robustness of the discount with respect to different countries of reference. For 
instance, the discount might only exist with respect to one group of countries which would 
imply that the discount is not only a Korean phenomenon, but a more general problem. Our 
sample covers the time period from 2002 to 2016. Our goal is also to analyze the evolution of 
the discount over time and to document any change. We specifically isolate the global financial 
crisis to document if there was a difference during this specific episode. We therefore divide 
the sample into three sub-periods, namely the pre-crisis (2002-2006), crisis (2007-2009), and 
post-crisis (2010-2016) periods. After deletion of observations with missing data, the final 
sample contains 25,863 unique firms for 162,495 firm-year observations. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
 Table 1 shows the number of firms from each country included in our sample as well as 
their evolution over time. We observe that the coverage of firms from developed markets 
remains fairly stable over time while the number of firms from emerging market and Asia-
Pacific has increased. The data on both historical and forecasted earnings are obtained from the 
 
2 The following filters are used in DFO navigator: category (Equities), market, currency (local currency), type 
(Equity), security (Major), and quote (Primary). For some countries, firms that are not listed on a domestic 
exchange are excluded. Dead and active securities are kept in order to avoid survivor bias. 
3 The sample includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Hong-Kong, India, 
Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Netherland, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, United Kingdom, and US. We do not include China due to the valuation 
issue regarding different classes of shares. 
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Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I\B\E\S) database covering a large number of countries 
and firms. This data is also widely used by practitioners. 
 As the Korea discount is generally defined in terms of PE ratio (see Appendix 1), we 
only consider the PE ratio in our analysis. Moreover, this ratio is very important for analysts as 
they essentially support their stock recommendation (Brown et al., 2015) with this measure.4 
Finally, investors primarily use this ratio to assess the possible under/over-valuation of a stock. 
Even though the anecdotal evidence on the Korean discount is mostly based on forward 
valuation (see Appendix 1), we analyze both 12 months trailing and 12 months forward earnings 
valuation ratios. The former refers to realized earnings, whereas the latter is based on the 
expected earnings (Welch, 2009, p. 47). The trailing ratio corresponds to a realized or historical 
perspective, whereas forward valuation has a prospective dimension. From an investor point-
of-view, the trailing ratio may be interpreted as how the market values the current/realized 
performance, whereas the forward valuation reflects more market expectations. The results 
might therefore be different for the two measures. For each firm, we collect the 12 months 
trailing earnings per share (item EPS1TR12) and forward earnings per share (item EPS1FD12) 
measured at year-end. Both are expressed in local currency. We also collect the year-end price 
(item IBP) expressed in local currency, and number of outstanding shares (item IBNOSH). 
From Worldscope, we collect the market capitalization in local currency (item 08001) and the 
market capitalization expressed in US dollars (item 07210). We use the Industry Classification 
benchmark (ICB) provided by FTSE Russell as industry classification. For each firm, we collect 
industry (item ICBIC), and sector (item ICBSC) level data. 
 The tests in Section 4 require information relative to the affiliation to chaebols for 
Korean firms. To determine whether Korean firms are affiliated or not to a chaebol, we use the 
Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) classification. This is a common practice in the 
literature (see for instance Black et al., 2015; Hwang and Kim, 2016; Kim et al., 2019). We 
consider as a chaebol firms, firms that are affiliated to one of the 30 largest business groups as 
classified by the KFTC. Authors working in this area motivate the choice of analyzing 
separately affiliation to one of the 30 largest chaebols by their economic power, higher 
diversification, and difference in capital and ownership structure (Bae et al., 2002). With this 
definition, on average, 27.1% of the Korean firms included in our sample are considered as 
 
4 According to a survey conducted by Brown et al. (2015), analysts use mostly the price-earnings and price-
earnings-growth ratios. 61.33 percent of the respondents claim to use these ratios very often. This result is 
consistent with Block’s (1999) survey findings. 
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being affiliated to a chaebol. They represent 67.6% of the total market value of the Korean 
market. 
 
3. Estimation of the Korea discount  
 This section presents estimates of the Korea discount. We first provide statistical 
evidence of the existence of this phenomenon. Second, we analyze the evolution of the Korea 
discount over time. We also investigate if Korea discount is a market-wide or industry-specific 
phenomenon. Our analysis is performed with three different approaches. The two first 
approaches are based on the valuation of portfolios. First, we use market-wide portfolios 
(market portfolio approach hereafter) to replicate the comparison of country indexes as it is 
usually done in financial press to illustrate the Korea discount. However, the main drawback of 
the market portfolio approach is the lack of time-series observations, which does not allow to 
analyze statistically the differences between two portfolios. To address this issue and conduct 
a more rigorous analysis, we build portfolios containing stocks of the same country and industry 
and compute their PE ratio (industry portfolio approach hereafter). The industry portfolio 
approach allows the analysis of difference in Korea discount across industries and its evolution 
over time. The third empirical approach is based on the PE of individual firms (individual stock 
approach hereafter). This approach allows controlling for firm-level characteristics. It also 
offers a finer view on the presence of the discount as the grouping of stocks into portfolios can 
eventually hide some differences in valuation ratios. 
 
3.1. Market portfolio approach 
 We first replicate the results obtained with market indexes by analysts and journalists to 
illustrate the Korea discount phenomenon. To do so, we compute market-level portfolio 
valuation ratio. The methodology used to compute market-level valuation is inspired by MSCI 
methodology (MSCI, 2019). The market-level PE ratio is computed as the ratio between the 
year-end sum of market capitalizations in USD divided by the sum of total earnings (forward 
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or trailing) in USD. 5 This measure of market-level value can be interpreted as an aggregated 
and value weighted measure. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
 Figure 1 presents evolution of forward (left hand figure) and trailing (right hand figure) 
PE ratio of Korea (dotted red line) and the full sample (blue line). Consistent with practitioners' 
anecdotal evidence, we observe the lower valuation level of the Korean market relative to the 
full sample both in terms of trailing and forward PE ratios. The only exception is the worst year 
of financial crisis (2008) when the valuation of the Korean market exceeded the valuation of 
other markets. The quick recovery of Korean economy can explain this phenomenon. Over the 
full period, we observe an upward trend for the valuation of the Korean market and a decline in 
valuation difference. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
 Table 2 presents mean valuation ratios for the full sample length (2002-2016) and for 
three different sub-periods. The average valuations obtained for the different periods confirm 
the observations based on Figure 1. For all sub-periods, Korean market exhibits a lower 
valuation than the full sample as well as other geographical areas. This observation is valid for 
both forward and trailing ratios, even though we find slightly smaller differences when 
valuation is compared in terms of trailing ratio. We also find that the difference in valuation 
depends on the geographical area used as benchmark. For instance, the difference in valuation 
between Korean market and emerging markets is lower than the difference with developed 
market. The industry portfolio and individual stocks analysis in the following subsections 
confirm these observations. 
 Consistent with anecdotal evidence from practitioners and the financial press, this first 
analysis based on market portfolio approach reveals a lower valuation ratio of Korean market 
 
5 Formally, the PE ratio of an index composed of N stocks is computed as (MSCI, 2019, p. 47): 
𝑃𝐸 =











in which, 𝑃𝑖 is the year-end share price of firm i, 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖  is the earning-per-share (forward or trailing) of firm i, 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 is the number of shares outstanding by firm i, and FX is the exchange rate between the currency of firm i 
and USD. All PEs are measured in USD except for Korea. 
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relative to other markets. Except during the global financial crisis, the difference in valuation 
is observed during the full period under review (2002-2016) and relative to different 
benchmarks. Our analysis also confirms that the Korea discount is not due to index construction 
or valuation methodology used by index providers. If the market portfolio approach has the 
advantage of being close to practitioners' practices, a major drawback is the impossibility to test 
statistically the existence of the Korea discount because of the modest number of observation 
points available. 
 
3.2 Industry portfolio approach 
 To address the issue of the lack of observations present in the market portfolio analysis 
but nevertheless keeping an aggregate data approach, we develop an industry by country-level 
analysis. The industry portfolio approach allows using pooled regression to estimate the Korea 
discount. In addition, through cross-section and time series estimations, this approach allows a 
finer analysis of the phenomenon by documenting its evolution over time and presence across 
industries. A difference between market and industry portfolio approaches is the weighting of 
each industry. In the market portfolio approach, each industry is value-weighted at the country-
level, whereas industries are equally weighted in the case of industry portfolio approach. 
Another difference between the market and industry portfolio approaches is the effect of 
exchange rates. Indeed, in the case of market portfolios, valuation is expressed in USD, whereas 
industry by country portfolios valuation ratios are computed in local currency.  
 Instead of sorting firms by geographical area as in the market portfolio approach, we 
sort firms by industry and then by country. The valuation of the industry by country annual 
portfolios is computed using the same methodology as for market portfolios. However, a 
drawback of industry portfolio approach is the limited number of firms in some industries 
making the estimation of country-level value sensitive to some outliers. To mitigate this issue, 
we winsorize the portfolios at the 1 and 99 percent levels. The estimate of the Korea discount 
is then obtained using industry portfolio-level pooled regression. The baseline model 
corresponds to equation (1)  
 
  𝑃𝐸𝑐,𝑘,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛿1 𝐾𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑎 + 𝛿2,𝑘 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛿3,𝑡 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑘,𝑡 (1) 
 
 where the PE ratio of portfolio for industry k in country c in year t is regressed on a 
Korea indicator, a dummy variable equal to one in the firm is from Korea. The regression also 
includes an industry (ICB industry-level) and year fixed effects. Since our analysis has a time-
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series dimension, the inclusion of year dummies allows controlling for macroeconomic trend. 
The coefficient 𝛿1 measures the difference in PE ratios between Korean portfolios and 
benchmark portfolios (other countries) after controlling for industry and fixed effects.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
 Table 3 presents the results of different estimations of equation (1). In Panel A, the 
Korea discount is estimated relative to different geographical benchmarks (group of countries). 
The goal of this analysis is to check if the Korea discount appears only relative to a certain type 
of countries. We report that, regardless of the benchmark, the coefficients of the Korea indicator 
is negative and highly significant meaning that, on average, the Korean market is discounted 
relative to other markets. However, we find some differences in terms of magnitude depending 
on the benchmark group of countries used. Reported to the sample mean6, the Korean market 
is discounted by 30.90 percent relative to developed markets, whereas the discount relative to 
other emerging markets is 25.64 percent. 7 The difference in discount magnitude depending on 
benchmark are consistent with observations made in the market portfolio approach (in Table 
2). In Panel B, we estimate the Korea discount on the three sub-periods corresponding to pre-
crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods. The results of the industry portfolio approach confirm the 
decline in magnitude observed in the market portfolio approach. We observe the smallest Korea 
discount during the financial crisis period which is consistent with our previous observations. 
The results for trailing ratio are provided in Appendix 2 and reveal some slight differences with 
results for forward earnings. We find that the discount relative to Asia-Pacific markets is larger 
than the discount relative to developed markets, whereas the discount for crisis-period is higher 
than the discount for post-crisis period. Results of Table 3 and Appendix 2 support the existence 
of a Korea discount which is robust to markets used as benchmark as well as to the periods 
studied. 
 Differences in industrial structure can possibly bias the interpretation based on valuation 
of market index since valuation levels differ from an industry to another. In addition, the Korea 
discount may be an industry specific rather than market-wide phenomenon. Typically, the 
financial press illustrates the Korea discount with market-level valuations. Such comparisons 
do not allow identifying potential industry effects. To investigate the discount at the industry-
level, we use an interaction term between the Korea indicator and industry variable. 
 
6 The mean is computed based on the sample of countries used as benchmark excluding Korea. 
7 The discount relative to the full sample is 29.29 percent and relative to other Asia-Pacific is 27.91 percent. 
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Coefficients of interaction terms provide industry-level Korea discount estimates. Figure 2 
illustrates industry-level discount estimates for pre- and post-crisis periods.8 To ease the 
reading, the discount is expressed in positive value and as percentage of the mean industry 
valuation. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
 In pre-crisis period (black bars), all industries are significantly discounted relative to 
similar industries in other countries. The magnitude of the discount ranges from 27.78 percent 
for consumer staples (ICB 45) to 52.83 percent in health care industry (ICB 20). In post-crisis 
period (grey bars), all industries remain discounted except health care industry exhibiting a non-
significant premium. Consistent with previous observations, we also note a decline in 
magnitude of the discount in all industries except for the energy industry. However, this decline 
differs from an industry to another. The largest differences are observed for health care (ICB 
20), financial (ICB 30), consumer staples (ICB 45), and industrial (ICB 50) firms. On the other 
hand, the discounts affecting technological (ICB 10), telecommunication (ICB 15), and 
consumer discretionary (ICB 40) firms remain stable. Industry-level analysis reveals that the 
Korea discount phenomenon affects all industries and is not due to the misvaluation of a specific 
industry. The analysis also provides an additional evidence of the decline of the Korea discount 
overtime.  
 While the market portfolio approach allows to replicate and confirm the results put 
forward by practitioners and media, the industry portfolio approach provides a strong statistical 
support to the existence of the Korea discount. Consistent with the observations made in 
Subsection 3.1, we find that the discount is statistically robust to the geographical area used as 
benchmark. We also find evidence of the persistence of the phenomenon even though the 
magnitude of the Korea discount decreases over time. Finally, our results show that the 
phenomenon is widely spread across Korean industries.  
 
3.3 Individual stock approach 
 In this part of the analysis, we fully exploit the depth of the firm-level sample to address 
the issues related to the identification based on aggregated data. The identification strategy is 
based on pooled regression including a set of control for size, time, and industry controls. 
 
8 The mean is computed for each industry based on the full sample length and countries excluding Korea. 
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Controlling for time, industry and size allows measuring a clean discount. To capture and 
measure the Korea discount, we add an indicator variable for Korean firms. The baseline model 
is given by equation (2). 
 
 𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛿1 𝐾𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑎 + 𝛿2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛿3 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛿4,𝑡 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
 
 where the earnings-to-price (EP) ratio of firm i at time t is regressed on the Korea 
indicator and the set of controls. Industry is controlled at an ICB sector-level. As control for 
size, we classify firms into deciles by relative market value at country-level. We then create 
dummy variables for each size decile. This measure has the advantages to be independent of 
exchange rates and to take into account differences in terms of size between markets. As a 
robustness check, we use the market value in USD as a control for size instead of decile size 
dummies. Estimation of the Korea discount does not change significantly (see Appendix 4). 
 Ideally, our study should analyze PE ratios as they are the standard measure used to 
document the Korea discount. However, one of the drawbacks of the PE ratio is that this metric 
becomes meaningless for firms generating negative earnings (Palepu et al., 2016, p. 313). In 
addition, this measure presents a discontinuity around zero earnings. Indeed, the ratio switches 
from an infinitely positive value to an infinitely negative value when earnings turn negative 
(Welch, 2009, pp. 512-513). This specificity may generate several issues for empirical analyses 
involving individual stocks.9 The non-linearity of the ratio (dependent variable) makes OLS 
inference difficult. For a given share price, two firms with extreme loss/gain have close PE 
despite of large differences in terms of earnings. On the other hand, the difference of ratios 
between two firms generating a small loss/gain is large. In addition, excluding firms with 
negative PE ratio may bias results since poor performing firms (in terms of earnings) are 
systematically excluded (Welch, 2009, p. 514). This is especially relevant considering that our 
sample includes the global financial crisis period and is likely to include a larger proportion of 
firms generating losses. For these reasons, as other authors do, we prefer to use the EP ratio 
instead of PE ratio.10 Also called earning yield, EP ratio at a firm-level is computed as the 
earnings per share (forward or trailing) divided by the year-end share price. This ratio allows 
having a measure continuous through zero. This transformation implies to invert the 
 
9 Note that these problems are less severe or non-existent for portfolios, which justifies the use of PE for the 
market and portfolio approaches. 
10 See Beaver and Morse (1978), Ou and Penman (1989), and Penman (1996) 
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interpretation of ratio as well. High EP ratio means low valuation and low EP denotes high firm 
valuation. Table 4 presents results for the baseline regression (2). 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
 Table 4 presents results for individual stocks approach. Since the dependent variable is 
earnings-to-price ratio instead of price-earnings, a positive coefficient on Korea dummy 
indicates a discount. As for the industry portfolio approach, we first test the robustness of the 
Korea discount relative to different geographical areas. Results are presented in Panel A and 
reveals a significant discount regardless the geographical area used as benchmark. Results are 
qualitatively consistent with the results obtained for the industry portfolio approach. The 
strongest discount appears when Korean firms are compared with developed market firms, 
whereas the discount relative to other emerging market firms is the smallest. A quantitative 
comparison of results is more difficult since weighting schemes of both approaches are not the 
same. Firms are value weighted in portfolio approaches, whereas they are equally weighted in 
pooled regressions. In addition, the individual stocks approach includes control for firm size. 
Results for trailing earnings ratio presented in the Appendix 3 are consistent except for the 
discount relative to emerging markets firms that becomes insignificant.  
 Panel B of Table 4 presents the results for the evolution of the Korea discount over time. 
The decline in the discount between pre- and post-crisis periods observed in the portfolio 
approach is confirmed for the individual stock analysis. We also observe a lower discount 
during the financial crisis period. The results are similar for trailing valuation ratio (see 
Appendix 3). The decline of Korea discount may find an explanation in the development and 
reforms undertaken since the previous financial crisis in Korea. The 1997 Asian crisis triggered 
reforms in Korea aiming to improve internal and external corporate governance mechanisms 
(Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013) as well as the financial situation of firms (Eichengreen et al., 
2015, p. 95). In addition, the depreciation of the Korean won and fiscal response stimulated 
exports and domestic demand. As a result, Korea experienced a quick recovery after the 
financial crisis proving its resilience and the ability of authorities to answer crisis (OECD, 2010; 
BOK, 2016). The upgrade of South Korea from emerging to developed country by FTSE in 
September 2009 is another illustration of the development and the economic strength of the 
country during the 2000s (Woods, 2013). 
 Finally, we compute industry-discount using an interaction between Korea indicator and 
industry dummies (at industry classification level). Results are provided in Appendix 5 and tend 
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to confirm observations of Figure 3 suggesting that the Korea discount is a widespread rather 
than being limited to some industries. 
 The individual stocks approach provides results consistent with those obtained for the 
market and industry portfolio approaches. They confirm the statistical robustness of the 
existence of the Korea discount even after accounting for size and industry effects. In addition, 
the results for the individual stocks approach also document a decline over time of the level of 
the discount which has been observed in previous analyses. Finally, the Korea discount appears 
to be a market-wide phenomenon since most of Korean industries exhibit a discount relative 
with their global peers. If the results of different empirical approaches converge in terms of 
interpretation, they have their own specificity that does not allow comparing them 
quantitatively. Indeed, the weights of firms, industry, and country differ from an approach to 
another. In market portfolio approach, countries and firms are value weighted. In addition, this 
approach takes into account the effects of exchange rate. In the industry portfolio approach, 
firms are value weighted within industries, but industries and countries are equally weighted. 
Finally, the individual stock approach attributes the same weight to all firms. The fact that the 
results converge qualitatively despite these differences indicates that the discount is a robust 
phenomenon affecting all Korean firms.  
 
3.4 Korea discount, corporate governance and financial development 
 As the discount appears to be a pervasive phenomenon across Korean firms, it might be 
due to some common factors. The general level of corporate governance in Korea is also often 
cited as a potential cause of the Korea discount phenomenon. Another possible common factor 
is the level of financial development. Indeed, we observe in Table 2 that emerging markets 
exhibit a lower valuation than developed markets. In order to control for these two possible 
explanations, we estimate Korea discount using models including country-level controls for 
corporate governance and development. To control for corporate governance, we include a set 
of dummy variables for legal origin. La Porta et al. (1998) document a link between the origin 
of the legal system of a country and shareholder protection. Korea has a German inspired legal 
system offering a better shareholder protection than French system, but less protection than 
common law countries. We also estimate models including controls for minority shareholder 
protection proxy namely minority shareholder protection score provided by the World Bank 
(WB) and the score of protection of minority shareholders provided by the World Economic 
Forum (WEF). Note that the former enters in the composition of the Doing business report 
published annually by the WB, whereas the second measure is part of the Global 
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Competitiveness Report established by the WEF and published every year. To control for the 
development of financial markets, we use the market size measured by the market capitalization 
of domestic firms expressed as the percentage of the GDP and the score of financial market 
development computed by the WEF as the 8th pillar of Global Competitiveness score. The 
availability of governance and development data is limited. In order to have a similar sample 
for different tests, we delete all observations with missing data. The final sample covers a 
restricted period from 2006 to 2015 and excludes Sweden and Taiwan.  
 
  [Insert Table 5 here] 
 
 The results for models including governance and development control variables are 
reported in Table 5. Regardless of the governance or development proxy used, the Korea 
discount remains statistically significant for both industry portfolio approach (Panel A) and 
individual stock approach (Panel B). Note that the Korea discount remains significant after 
controlling for governance and development in terms of trailing valuation (see Appendix 6) as 
well. The results of these additional tests show that the Korea discount persist even after 
accounting for differences between countries in terms of corporate governance as well as in 
terms of economic and financial development. In addition, their effect on the magnitude of the 
Korea discount seems very limited suggesting that the major part of the phenomenon has other 
origins.  
 
4. Role of chaebols in the Korea discount  
 Since numerous observers attribute the main cause of the discount to the presence of 
chaebols, we analyze specifically the link between the Korea discount and chaebols. Chaebols 
are family-run business groups that play a central role in the Korean economy. The emergence 
and development of chaebols came hand to hand with the industrialization of South Korea. To 
rebuild and industrialize Korea after the devastations of World War II and the Korean War, the 
government decided to develop certain industries. Selected entrepreneurs benefitted from 
support and privileged access to scarce resources in reward for implementing government 
strategy. The government support and protection transformed some initially small family 
businesses into large and diversified business groups (Eichengreen et al., 2015, pp.142-147). 
Chaebols contributed to turn Korea from one of the poorest countries to one of the most 
advanced economies and largest exporters in the world (Eichengreen et al., 2015, p.1). 
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However, the success of chaebols also generated some problems. The Korean economy became 
heavily dependent on those business groups that accumulated a substantial economic power. 
The excessive economic power of chaebols is likely to affect market competition and harm 
competitiveness of SMEs (OECD, 2018, p. 74). In addition, preferential loans provided by 
government fosters debt financing of chaebols. The high leverage made some chaebols 
financially vulnerable. As consequence, the 1997 Asian financial crisis led to the collapse of 
many chaebols and the country was heavily affected by this crisis requiring the intervention of 
the International Monetary Fund (Powers, 2010). Finally, chaebols are often criticized for their 
supposedly poor corporate governance and minority shareholder expropriation. These problems 
might affect the valuation of firms affiliated to a chaebol, but poor corporate governance is the 
main reason put forward by observers (The Economist, 2012). 
 
4.1 Corporate governance of chaebols 
 Firms affiliated to a chaebol potentially suffer from a poor corporate governance and 
their non-controlling shareholders are exposed to expropriation by controlling shareholders. 
The structure of chaebols are the roots of these risks. Indeed, unlike conglomerates in which 
subsidiaries are wholly owned, firms affiliated to a business group are often publicly traded and 
rarely fully owned by the controlling shareholder (Colpan and Hikino, 2010, p. 27). Different 
mechanisms such as cross-shareholding, pyramids as well as appointment of individuals related 
to chaebols on the board of directors and/or in executive positions provide control over affiliates 
to shareholders with a limited amount of equity investment (Bae et al., 2002; Hwang and Seo, 
2000). Therefore, the presence of a controlling shareholder with relative low equity stake 
creates principal-principal agency conflicts worsened by the fact that group-level interests are 
often prioritized over affiliate-level (and thus minority shareholder) interests (OECD, 2018, p. 
79; Hwang and Seo, 2000). In addition, controlling families are often accused of nepotism and 
to favor their own interest instead of other shareholder wealth (Brown, 2001). Academic 
literature reports evidence of expropriation of minority shareholders through tunneling (Black 
et al., 2015), acquisitions (Bae et al., 2002; Bae et al., 2008), or during successions (Hwang and 
Kim, 2016). Since the finance literature documents a positive association between corporate 
governance and firm valuation (Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al. 2009) and chaebol 
affiliates account for a large share of Korean stock market (30% of firms and 68% on market 
value in our sample), it is reasonable to think that poor governance in chaebols is reflected in 




4.2 Chaebols and the Korea discount 
 We analyze the role of chaebols using both industry portfolio and individual stock 
approaches. The procedure for industry portfolio approach is similar to the one used in Section 
3 except that we split Korea portfolio into chaebol and non-chaebol firms portfolios. This 
method allows us computing discount for chaebol and non-chaebol firms by including a dummy 
variable for Korean chaebol and Korean non-chaebol portfolios in equation (1). In addition to 
portfolio approach, we also test the difference in valuation between chaebol and non-chaebol 
firms using individual stocks approach. To do so, we add to equation (2) a set of two dummy 
variables taking a value of one for Korean non-chaebol firms and one for Korean chaebol firms 
respectively, and zero for non-Korean firms. If the affiliation to a chaebol (and therefore poor 
corporate governance) is the main driver of the discount, we should only find a lower valuation 
for chaebol affiliates and no discount for unaffiliated firms.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
 Table 6 presents results for the estimation of the discount affecting chaebol and non-
chaebol Korean firms relative to their foreign peers. Both industry portfolio (Panel A) and 
individual stock (Panel B) approaches provide qualitatively similar results. First, we observe 
that chaebol affiliates exhibit a lower discount than non-chaebol firms over the full sample 
length as well as different sub-periods studied. Over the full period and in terms of forward PE, 
the chaebol portfolio is discounted by 14.33 percent in comparison with other country 
portfolios, whereas non-chaebol portfolio exhibits a discount of 26.44 percent. The results 
exhibited in Table 6 are consistent with the decline in the Korea discount observed in the 
market-level analysis. We observe that the discount on non-chaebol firms decreases gradually, 
whereas the discount on chaebol firms drops and is non-significant during the financial crisis. 
This observation suggests that chaebol firms are likely to be responsible of the lower discount 
observed during the financial crisis for the full sample.  
 The higher valuation of chaebol firms relative to non-chaebol firms does not support the 
hypothesis that chaebol affiliates and their poor governance is the main cause of the Korea 
discount. They show that both types of firms suffer from the discount and that affiliation to a 
chaebol in Korea has positive effect on valuation. Therefore, it is not chaebol affiliates that 
drive value of the Korean market down. In order to test if the there is a significant difference 
between discount of chaebol and non-chaebol firms, we use the individual stock approach and 
add an interaction terms between Korea and chaebol indicator. The results in Panel C show that 
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the difference in discount between chaebol and non-chaebol firms becomes statistically 
significant since the financial crisis. This result is valid for both forward and trailing valuation 
ratio (see Appendix 7). The higher valuation of chaebol affiliates relative to unaffiliated firms 
is, to some extent, consistent with the existing literature as it finds that chaebol affiliation is 
associated with a valuation premium during the 2000s (Black et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2010). 
However, the relative valuation of chaebol is found to be changing over time. During the 1980s, 
affiliation to a chaebol had a value enhancing effect (Lee et al., 2010) that turned into a discount 
during the 1990s (Ferris et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2010).  
 Why did the discount decrease or even disappear for chaebols affiliates since the 
financial crisis? There are different possible explanations for the change in the discount of 
affiliated firms. First, it is likely that chaebol affiliates suffered less and recovered faster from 
the global financial crisis than unaffiliated Korean firms as reported by Oliver (2010). Indeed, 
academic literature provides both theoretical and empirical evidence of the benefits of business 
group affiliation during crisis periods. Indeed, business groups are often seen an answer to 
institutional voids or market failures (Leff, 1978). During the 1997 Asian financial crisis, 
chaebol affiliates were on average less affected by the crisis (Chang, 2006; Almeida et al., 
2015), benefitted from better access to financing (Gormley et al., 2015), and experienced faster 
recovery (Lee et al., 2010; Goh et al., 2016). Empirical evidence also suggest a beneficial effect 
of business group affiliation in Chile (Santioni et al., 2019) and Italy (Buchuk et al., 2019) 
during the global financial crisis. 
 A second explanation is the change in the investor perception of some large Korean 
firms relative to their foreign competitors. The fact that MSCI still classifies South Korea as an 
emerging market whereas FTSE upgraded the country in 2009 illustrates the debate regarding 
the classification of Korea (Woods, 2013). Despite of this unclear classification, some Korean 
firms gained an international reputation and visibility in playing a leading role in some 
industries such as consumer electronics, semiconductors or automotive since the mid-2000s.11 
Access to resources such as capital, skilled workforce and knowledge represent a competitive 
advantage for chaebol affiliates relative to unaffiliated firms especially in the context of 
globalized and fierce competition requiring investment in R&D. These elements are likely to 
 
11 For instance, Samsung dominates the semiconductor industry, whereas SK Hynix an affiliate of SK Group is 
another key player in this industry. The success of Samsung in consumer products such as smartphones contributes 
to the visibility of the brand. On this market, the share of Samsung jumped from 3.3 to 20.4 percent between 2009 
and 2015. For instance, in the annual ranking of brand value established by Brand Finance, Samsung jumped from 
the 32nd to the 3rd rank between 2007 and 2016, whereas during the same period Hyundai moved from the 154th to 
the 36th rank 
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have an impact on the perception of foreign investors, who might treat chaebol firms differently 
from other Korean firms due to their international reputation. 
 Changes in the legal framework are also likely to have narrowed the differences between 
chaebol firms and their international counterparts. In 2009, a series of reforms targeting 
primarily business groups abolished some equity investment restrictions and increased 
disclosure requirement to promote market monitoring (KFTC, 2009 and 2010). In addition, the 
mid-2000s is also marked by an increase in domestic and foreign shareholder activism (Song, 
2006 and 2012; Lim, 2007). For instance, in 2006, a group of investors led by Carl Icahn entered 
in the capital of KT&G pushing for changes in order to enhance shareholder value (Lim, 2006). 
Another example is the Dubai-based Sovereign Asset Management that entered in the capital 
of SK Corp and asked for changes in the management (Song, 2012). 
Resilience and recovery from the financial crisis, changes in investor perception towards 
large Korean firms and reforms are all likely to reduce the discount affecting chaebols firms 
and therefore increasing the difference in valuation between chaebol and non-chaebol firms. 
This difference is also consistent with an alternative explanation, less discussed in the context 
of the Korea discount, which is related to the substantial economic power that chaebols have 
accumulated over time. Indeed, policymakers and international organizations point out the 
negative effect of the dominance of chaebols on competition and competitiveness of other firms. 
The lower valuations of non-affiliated firms could therefore simply reflect the fact that these 
firms are harmed by the presence of chaebols. However, the identification of the exact 
determinants of the discount is beyond the scope of this paper and deserves a specific research 
focused on this issue. Our objective was to investigate the claim made by several observers that 
the Korea discount is solely due to the chaebols. We show that it is not the case but that chaebols 
certainly play an indirect role in the existence of the discount.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 Different observers of the Korean economy claim that domestic stocks are undervalued 
and trade at a discount relative to foreign firms. This phenomenon is called "the Korea 
discount". However, so far, this claim is only based on anecdotal evidence comparing different 
indexes or different individual stocks. This paper is the first to provide scientific evidence on 
the existence of this discount. Using a large sample of international stocks over the period 2002-
2016, we find that Korean stocks exhibit, on average, a PE ratio significantly lower by 30% 
than their global peers. We use different approaches to document empirically the existence of 
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this discount. They all converge to the same conclusions and our results show that the 
phenomenon is pervasive as it affects most Korean stocks. It is present in all industries and over 
the whole sample period. The discount is significant with respect to all countries of reference 
used to measure it. Korean stocks have lower PE ratios than firms from developed and emerging 
markets, as well stocks from the Asia-Pacific region. We also document that the discount tends 
to decrease over time and that is smaller in recent years. It has even completely disappeared 
during the peak of the financial crisis in 2008. The presence of the discount is robust to factors 
such as differences between countries in terms of corporate governance as well as in terms of 
financial development. The second part of our analysis investigates the link between the Korea 
discount and chaebols. These powerful business groups dominate the Korean economy and are 
often cited as a potential cause of the Korea discount. Observers assume that they are 
responsible of the discount because of their poor corporate governance and the high risk of 
minority shareholder expropriation, which should drive down their market valuation. Our 
results do not support this explanation as we find that the discount affects both chaebol and 
non-chaebol firms. Furthermore, we find that the discount of chaebol firms is significantly 
lower than the discount of other Korean firms since 2007. This result is possibly associated with 
the substantial market power of chaebols and its effect on unaffiliated firms. It could also be 
due to the fact that some chaebol firms gained an international reputation and visibility which 
could also lead investor to consider chaebol firms differently than less known Korean firms. 
However, the exact identification of the determinants of the discount is beyond the scope of this 
paper. We leave it for further research. Nevertheless, our paper contains two main contributions. 
It documents the existence of "the Korea discount", an issue not addressed by the academic 
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Table 1 provides the number of firm-year observations per country and geographical areas for even-numbered years. Emerging 
markets include Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, Israel (until 2009), South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and 
Philippines. All other countries (including Israel since 2010) are classified as developed markets. Classification is based on 
MSCI. Korea is excluded from the emerging market and developed market portfolios to avoid overlap issues. Asia-Pacific 
countries include Australia, Hong-Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and 
Thailand. Korea is excluded from the Asia-Pacific portfolio to avoid overlap issue. The full sample consists in 162,495 firm-
year observations (25,863 unique firms). 
 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 
Australia 304 359 438 460 491 521 592 561 
Austria 31 28 38 46 38 36 38 37 
Belgium 81 79 88 92 82 78 79 80 
Brazil 14 11 45 101 108 126 129 108 
Canada 364 524 679 663 705 759 727 642 
Chile 19 16 19 16 37 35 30 35 
France 334 311 383 400 369 371 361 401 
Germany 734 558 710 865 794 767 729 699 
Hong-Kong 207 272 300 349 399 409 486 427 
India 83 145 372 419 616 685 696 664 
Indonesia 69 71 77 84 92 127 137 132 
Israel 18 24 19 28 31 33 35 38 
Italy 143 148 181 181 182 175 168 181 
Japan 1447 1156 1300 1156 1087 1021 1232 1290 
Korea 294 162 225 178 171 324 521 619 
Malaysia 201 228 285 335 273 245 269 253 
Netherland 114 94 100 93 87 80 79 82 
New-Zealand 48 56 63 64 57 58 78 80 
Philippines 43 26 40 46 46 59 72 69 
Singapore 144 197 212 202 166 167 181 170 
South Africa 137 100 126 134 145 133 125 126 
Spain 101 98 100 108 107 100 90 90 
Sweden 147 130 156 173 224 254 208 257 
Switzerland 152 139 159 166 162 153 146 151 
Taiwan 201 183 259 205 304 347 492 491 
Thailand 125 202 211 148 143 154 191 207 
UK 793 837 989 1003 960 954 954 914 
US 2894 3086 3197 3098 3052 3107 3363 3298 
Asia-Pacific 2872 2895 3557 3468 3674 3793 4426 4344 
Emerging markets 910 1006 1453 1516 1764 1911 2141 2085 
Developed markets 8038 8072 9093 9119 8993 9043 9546 9398 




Price-earnings ratios of market portfolios 
 
 
Table 2 presents mean forward (Panel A) and trailing (Panel B) price-earnings ratios for the full sample length and three sub-
periods. Emerging markets include Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, Israel (until 2009), South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Thailand, and Philippines. All other countries (including Israel since 2010) are classified as developed markets. Classification 
is based on MSCI. Korea is excluded from the emerging market and developed market portfolios to avoid overlap issue. Asia-
Pacific countries include Australia, Hong-Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Thailand. Korea is excluded from the Asia-Pacific portfolio to avoid overlap issue. The full sample consists in 
162,495 firm-year observations (25,863 unique firms). 
 2002-16 2002-06 2007-09 2010-16 
Panel A: Forward price-earnings      
Full sample 12.81 12.79 11.63 13.34 
Korea 9.38 8.22 10.61 9.69 
Developed markets 12.82 12.80 11.62 13.34 
Emerging markets 11.97 10.74 11.90 12.88 
Asia-Pacific 13.21 15.19 11.97 12.32 
Panel B: Trailing price-earnings      
Full sample 14.50 14.31 13.65 14.99 
Korea 11.30 10.00 13.17 11.44 
Developed markets 14.50 14.32 13.65 14.99 
Emerging markets 13.96 12.50 13.97 14.99 





Estimation of the Korea discount for industry portfolios (forward EP) 
 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the estimation of the Korea discount using industry portfolio approach based on equation (1). 
Dependent variables are 12 months forward price-earnings ratio. In Panel A, regressions are run on the full sample length 
(2002-2016) on different geographical benchmark. In column (1), all countries are included. Columns (2), (3), and (4) show 
results when only emerging markets, developed markets and Asia-Pacific countries are used as benchmark. Emerging markets 
include Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, Israel (until 2009), South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Philippines. All 
other countries (including Israel since 2010) are classified as developed markets. Classification is based on MSCI. Korea is 
excluded from the emerging market and developed market portfolios to avoid overlap issue. Asia-Pacific countries include 
Australia, Hong-Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Korea 
is excluded from the Asia-Pacific portfolio to avoid overlap issue. In Panel B, the sample is divided in sub-periods 
corresponding to pre-crisis (column (2)), crisis (column (3)), and post-crisis (column (4)) periods. Industry-country portfolio 
PE are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent level. All regressions include industry (ICB industry-level) and year fixed effect. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at country-level and showed in parentheses. p-value *<5% **<1% ***<0.1% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Forward price-earnings by by geographical benchmark 
 
Full sample Emerging markets Developed 
markets 
Asia-Pacific 
Constant 13.68*** 9.76*** 15.42*** 12.44*** 
 (0.842) (1.329) (0.706) (1.390) 
Korea -4.23*** -3.49*** -4.59*** -3.93*** 
 (0.288) (0.483) (0.325) (0.407) 
Observations 4412 1600 2971 1915 
Adjusted R-squared 0.185 0.266 0.210 0.249 
Panel B: Forward price-earnings by sub-periods 
 2002-16 2002-06 2007-09 2010-16 
Constant 13.68*** 15.09*** 15.28*** 14.69*** 
 (0.842) (1.040) (0.741) (0.682) 
Korea -4.23*** -6.08*** -2.80*** -3.51*** 
 (0.288) (0.516) (0.344) (0.265) 
Observations 4412 1427 885 2100 








Estimation of the Korea discount for individual stocks (forward EP) 
 
 
Table 4 presents the results for the individual stocks approach corresponding to equation (2). Dependent variables are 12 months 
forward earnings-to-price ratio. In Panel A, regressions are run on the full sample length (2002-2016) sorted by geographical 
area. Emerging markets include Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, Israel (until 2009), South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Thailand, and Philippines. All other countries (including Israel since 2010) are classified as developed markets. Classification 
is based on MSCI. Korea is excluded from the emerging market and developed market portfolios to avoid overlap issue. Asia-
Pacific countries include Australia, Hong-Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Thailand. Korea is excluded from the Asia-Pacific portfolio to avoid overlap issue. In Panel B, the sample is 
divided in sub-periods corresponding to pre-crisis (column (2)), crisis (column (3)), and post-crisis (column (4)) periods. Size 
effect is controlled by a set of dummy variables for domestic market capitalization deciles. All regressions include industry 
(ICB sector-level) and year fixed effect. Robust standard errors are clustered at firm-level and showed in parentheses. p-value 
*<5% **<1% ***<0.1% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Forward earnings-to-price by geographical benchmark 
 
Full sample Emerging markets Developed 
markets 
Asia-Pacific 
Constant 0.008 0.208*** -0.014 0.177*** 
 (0.021) (0.057) (0.021) (0.049) 
Korea 0.066*** 0.028*** 0.074*** 0.043*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Observations 162495 28346 138773 58978 
Adjusted R-squared 0.004 0.001 0.007 0.003 
Panel B: Forward earnings-to-price by sub-periods 
 2002-16 2002-06 2007-09 2010-16 
Constant 0.008 0.020 0.036 0.014 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.033) 
Korea 0.066*** 0.095*** 0.051*** 0.058*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Observations 162495 48088 32879 81528 





Estimation of the Korea discount with country factors (forward EP) 
 
 
Table 5 provides the results of the estimation of the Korea discount (based on forward earnings ratio) including control for 
country-level corporate governance and financial development. To have comparable sample, we delete observations with 
missing data. The final sample covers period 2006-2015 and excludes Taiwan and Sweden. Column (1) provide results without 
corporate governance and financial development for comparison purpose. Column (2) shows results for models including 
control for legal origin. Columns (3) and (4) show results for model including control for minority investor protection proxies 
provided by World Bank and World Economic Forum. The minority investor protection score provided by the World Bank is 
part of the Doing business report and ranges from 0 to 100. The protection of minority shareholder is part of the 1st pillar 
(institution) of the Global Competitiveness Report published by the WEF and ranges between 1 and 7 (best). Column (5) shows 
results for models including the market capitalization of domestic firms as percentage of the GDP (provided by WB). Column 
(6) shows results for models including financial market development score provided by WEF. The financial market 
development is the 8th pillar of the Global Competitiveness Score and ranges between 1 and 10. In Panel A, Korea discount is 
estimated by industry portfolio approach. The dependent variable is forward price-earnings ratio Industry-country portfolio PE 
are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent level. All regressions include industry (ICB industry-level) and year fixed effect. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at country-level. In Panel B, the Korea discount is estimated by individual stocks approach. The 
dependent variable is forward earnings-to-price ratio. Size effect is controlled by a set of dummy variables for domestic market 
capitalization deciles. All regressions include industry (ICB sector-level) and year fixed effect. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at firm-level and showed in parentheses. p-value *<5% **<1% ***<0.1% 










Market size Financial 
market dev. 
(WEF) 
Panel A : Industry portfolio approach  
Constant 16.123*** 16.155*** 15.974*** 16.750*** 16.292*** 15.572*** 
 (0.797) (0.919) (1.089) (2.406) (0.806) (2.202) 
Korea -3.300*** -3.516*** -3.292*** -3.417*** -3.357*** -3.216*** 
 (0.264) (0.352) (0.244) (0.390) (0.262) (0.299) 
German  0.183     
  (0.629)     
French  -0.186     
  (0.595)     
Investor 
protection    0.002 -0.117   
   (0.015) (0.439)   
Market size      -0.001*  
     (0.000)  
Financial 
market 
development      0.105 
      (0.374) 
Observations 2613 2613 2613 2613 2613 2613 
Adjusted R-





Table 5 (ctd) 
Panel B : Individual stock approach 
Constant 0.024 0.023 0.042 -0.044 0.014 -0.042 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.024) (0.078) (0.025) (0.057) 
Korea 0.059*** 0.053*** 0.058*** 0.073*** 0.064*** 0.071*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.016) (0.007) (0.012) 
German  0.007     
  (0.004)     
French  -0.005     
  (0.014)     
Investor 
protection   -0.000 0.012   
   (0.000) (0.012)   
Market size     0.000***  
     (0.000)  
Financial 
market 
development      0.012 
      (0.009) 
Observations 99656 99656 99656 99656 99656 99656 
Adjusted R-




Estimates of the chaebol and non-chaebol Korea discounts (forward EP) 
 
 
Table 6 presents the results for models including indicators for chaebol and non-chaebol firms based on forward earnings. 
Chaebol indicator takes value 1 for firms affiliated to one of the top 30 chaebols based on KFTC classification. Non-chaebol 
indicator takes value 1 for Korean firms that are not affiliated to a top 30 chaebols. Columns (1) presents results for the full 
sample length. Columns (2), (3), and (4) present results for pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods respectively. Panel A 
presents result for industry portfolio approach and dependent variable is forward price-earnings. Portfolio for financial (ICB 
30), real estate (ICB 35), energy (ICB 60), and utilities (ICB 65) are excluded due to low number of Korean firms. Industry-
country portfolio PE are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent level. All regressions include industry (ICB industry-level) and year 
fixed effect. Robust standard errors are clustered at country-level and showed in parentheses. Panel B presents results for 
individual stocks approach and dependent variable is forward earnings-to-price. Panel C presents results for individual stocks 
approach including interaction between Korea and chaebol indicator. Individual stocks approach models (Panels B and C) 
include control for size based on a set of dummy variables for domestic market capitalization deciles. All regressions include 
industry (ICB sector-level) and year fixed effect. Robust standard errors are clustered at firm-level and showed in parentheses. 
p-value *<5% **<1% ***<0.1% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 2002-16 2002-06 2007-09 2010-16 
Panel A: Industry portfolio approach  
Constant 13.97*** 15.51*** 12.09*** 13.99*** 
 (0.965) (1.095) (1.130) (0.756) 
Chaebol -2.07*** -4.68*** -0.51 -1.59*** 
 (0.264) (0.538) (0.417) (0.278) 
Non-chaebol -3.82*** -6.01*** -3.21*** -2.81*** 
 (0.289) (0.598) (0.467) (0.294) 
Observations 2933 953 390 1392 
Adjusted R-squared 0.195 0.166 0.155 0.238 
Panel B: Individual stock approach 
Constant 0.008 0.020 0.035 0.014 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.033) 
Chaebol 0.030*** 0.086*** -0.004 0.016** 
 (0.005) (0.015) (0.009) (0.005) 
Non-chaebol 0.080*** 0.099*** 0.076*** 0.072*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Observations 162495 48088 32879 81528 
Adjusted R-squared 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.004 
Panel C: Individual stock approach with interaction 
Constant 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.01    
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.033)    
Korea 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)    
Korea*Chaebol -0.05*** -0.01 -0.08*** -0.06*** 
 (0.008) (0.016) (0.013) (0.010)    
Observations 162495 48088 32879 81528    




Evolution of price-earnings ratios over time 
 
 
Figure 1 presents the evolution of forward (left hand figure) and trailing (right hand figure) price-earnings ratios for the full 
sample (blue line) and Korea (red dotted line) portfolios. The measure of market valuation follows the MSCI methodology 
(MSCI, 2019) and is computed as  
𝑃𝐸 =











in which, 𝑃𝑖 is the year-end share price of firm i, 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖 is the earning-per-share (forward or trailing) of firm i, 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 is the 
number of shares outstanding by firm i, and FXi is the exchange rate between the currency of firm i and USD. The Korea 
portfolio is weighted using relative market capitalization in KRW. Full sample portfolio is weighted using market capitalization 
in USD. The full sample includes 162,495 firm-year observations (25,863 unique firms). 
 






Pre- and post-crisis Korea discount per industry 
 
 
Figure 2 presents the Korea discount by industry for pre-crisis (blue bar) and post-crisis (red bar) periods estimated using the 
industry portfolio approach and forward price-earnings ratio as dependent variable. Estimation is based on the following 
equation 
 
𝑃𝐹𝑐,𝑘,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛿1 𝐾𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑎 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛿2,𝑘 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛿3,𝑡 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑘,𝑡  
 
In which, the PE ratio of the portfolio for industry k of country c at time t is regressed on an interaction between Korea dummy 
and industry indicators. Regression includes year and industry (ICB industry-level) fixed effects. Portfolio PE are winsorized 







References to the Korea discount in the financial press 
 
Appendix 1 presents articles in the US press discussing/mentioning the Korea discount.  
Keyword: “Korea discount”, Journals: The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), The New York Times, Newsweek, The Financial Times 
(FT), Forbes, Bloomberg, The Economist, Barron’s , Databases: Europresse, Factiva. The measures are price-earnings ratio 
(P/E), price-to-book ratio (P/B). P/E can forward (fd) or trailing (tr). 
Author(s) Year Journal Measure Benchmark 
Norton 2005 Barron’s P/E Asia ex-Japan 




Norton 2006 Barron’s P/E Asia 
Norton 2007 Barron’s P/E Asia ex-Japan and emerging markets 
Norton 2010 Barron’s P/B Asia's cheapest market after Japan 
Norton 2011 Barron’s P/E India, China, Taiwan 
Zhong 2015 Barron’s P/E Fd MSCI Asia-ex-Japan Index 
Norton 2010 Barron’s P/E cheapest outside Pakistan and 
Vietnam 
FT 2005 FT P/E Fd emerging market 
Hasung 2006 FT P/E 
 
FT 2010 FT P/B Asia ex-Japan 
Noble 2010 FT P/B China, India 
Noble 2010 FT P/E China, India 
Oliver 2010 FT P/E Fd MSCI World 
Song and Noble 2013 FT P/E India, Indonesia 
Song and Noble 2013 FT P/E rest of the region 
Song 2014 FT P/B MSCI All-Country World Index 
Mundy 2014 FT P/E foreign 
Mundy 2014 FT P/E Fd MSCI World 
Song 2015 FT P/E Tr (?) Japan and Hong-Kong 
Song 2015 FT P/E Fd 
(Hyundai) 
Toyota and Honda 
Song 2017 FT P/E Fd MSCI Asia Pacific index 
Harris 2017 FT P/E global peers 
FT 2018 FT P/E global peers. 
The Economist 2011 The Economist P/E Asia 
The Economist 2012 The Economist P/E Fd other Asian stock markets 
Song 2003 WSJ P/B Taiwan 
Santini 2006 WSJ P/E Asia excluding Japan 
WSJ 2007 WSJ P/E Fd 
(Hyundai) 
Toyota, Honda and Nissan 
Sternberg 2011 WSJ e. g. P/B Asia 







Estimation of the Korea discount for industry portfolios (trailing PE) 
 
 
Appendix 2 presents results for estimation of Korea discount using industry portfolio approach based on equation (1). 
Dependent variables are 12 months trailing price-earnings ratio. In panel A, regressions are run on the full sample length (2002-
2016) on different geographical benchmark. In column (1), all countries are included. Columns (2), (3), and (4) show results 
when only emerging markets, developed markets and Asia-Pacific countries are used as benchmark. Emerging markets include 
Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, Israel (until 2009), South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Philippines. All other 
countries (including Israel since 2010) are classified as developed markets. Classification is based on MSCI. Korea is excluded 
from the emerging market and developed market portfolios to avoid overlap issue. Asia-Pacific countries include Australia, 
Hong-Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Korea is excluded 
from the Asia-Pacific portfolio to avoid overlap issue. In panel B, the sample is divided in sub-periods corresponding to pre-
crisis (column (2)), crisis (column (3)), and post-crisis (column (4)) periods. Industry-country portfolio PE are winsorized at 1 
and 99 percent level. All regressions include industry (ICB industry-level) and year fixed effect. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at country-level and showed in parentheses. p-value *<5% **<1% ***<0.1% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Trailing price-earnings by geographical benchmark 
 
Full sample Emerging markets Developed 
markets 
Asia-Pacific 
Constant 17.73*** 11.62*** 20.31*** 17.38*** 
 (1.769) (2.018) (2.092) (3.209) 
Korea -4.43*** -4.07*** -4.62*** -4.72*** 
 (0.408) (0.730) (0.490) (0.692) 
Observations 4412 1600 2971 1915 
Adjusted R-squared 0.064 0.139 0.063 0.114 
Panel B: Trailing price-earnings by sub-periods 
 2002-16 2002-06 2007-09 2010-16 
Constant 17.73*** 18.00*** 23.69*** 19.25*** 
 (1.769) (2.203) (2.139) (1.381) 
Korea -4.43*** -7.66*** -5.17*** -1.87*** 
 (0.408) (0.622) (0.855) (0.416) 
Observations 4412 1427 885 2100 





Estimation of the Korea discount for individual stocks (trailing EP) 
 
 
Appendix 3 presents results for individual stocks approach corresponding to equation (2). Dependent variables are 12 months 
treiling earnings-to-price ratio. In panel A, regressions are run on the full sample length (2002-2016) sorted by geographical 
area. Emerging markets include Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, Israel (until 2009), South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Thailand, and Philippines. All other countries (including Israel since 2010) are classified as developed markets. Classification 
is based on MSCI. Korea is excluded from the emerging market and developed market portfolios to avoid overlap issue. Asia-
Pacific countries include Australia, Hong-Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Thailand. Korea is excluded from the Asia-Pacific portfolio to avoid overlap issue.  In panel B, the sample is 
divided in sub-periods corresponding to pre-crisis (column (2)), crisis (column (3)), and post-crisis (column (4)) periods. Size 
effect is controlled by a set of dummy variables for domestic market capitalization deciles. All regressions include industry 
(ICB sector-level) and year fixed effect. Robust standard errors are clustered at firm-level and showed in parentheses. p-value 
*<5% **<1% ***<0.1% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Trailing earnings-to-price by geographical benchmark 
 
Full sample Emerging markets Developed 
markets 
Asia-Pacific 
Constant -0.182*** 0.099 -0.215*** 0.060 
 (0.023) (0.070) (0.023) (0.039) 
Korea 0.064*** 0.012 0.075*** 0.031*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Observations 162495 28346 138773 58978 
Adjusted R-squared 0.008 -0.000 0.013 0.002 
Panel B: Trailing earnings-to-price by sub-periods 
 2002-16 2002-06 2007-09 2010-16 
Constant -0.182*** -0.159*** -0.121*** -0.124*** 
 (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) (0.033) 
Korea 0.064*** 0.096*** 0.048*** 0.055*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) 
Observations 162495 48088 32879 81528 





Estimation of the Korea discount with alternative controls for size (forward EP) 
 
 
Appendix 4 presents results for individual stocks approach individual stocks approach corresponding to equation (2). Dependent 
variables is 12 months forward earnings-to-price ratio. Regressions are run on the full sample length (2002-2016) sorted by 
geographical area. Emerging markets include Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, Israel (until 2009), South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Thailand, and Philippines. All other countries (including Israel since 2010) are classified as developed markets. Classification is 
based on MSCI. Korea is excluded from the emerging market and developed market portfolios to avoid overlap issue. Asia-Pacific 
countries include Australia, Hong-Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and 
Thailand. Korea is excluded from the Asia-Pacific portfolio to avoid overlap issue. In panel A, size effect is controlled by a set of 
dummy variables for domestic market capitalization deciles. In panel B, size effect is controlled by market value in USD. All 
regressions include industry (ICB sector-level) and year fixed effect. Robust standard errors are clustered at firm-level and showed 
in parentheses. p-value *<5% **<1% ***<0.1% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 





Panel A: Dummy size      
Constant 0.008 0.208*** -0.014 0.177*** 
 (0.021) (0.057) (0.021) (0.049) 
Korea 0.066*** 0.028*** 0.074*** 0.043*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Observations 162495 28346 138773 58978 
Adjusted R-squared 0.004 0.001 0.007 0.003 
Panel B: Market value (USD)  
Constant 0.063*** 0.188*** 0.052*** 0.158*** 
 (0.012) (0.026) (0.012) (0.035) 
Korea 0.067*** 0.026*** 0.075*** 0.042*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Observations 162495 28346 138773 58978 





Estimates of the Korea discount for industries 
 
 
Appendix 5 presents relative valuation of Korean industries based on equation (2) including an interaction between Korea and industry indicators. Coefficients correspond to interaction between 
Korea indicator and industry dummy (at industry-level). Dependent variables are 12 months forward earnings-to-price ratio (left hand) and 12 months trailing earnings-to-price ratio (right hand). 
Columns (1) and (5) present results for the whole period. Columns (2) to (4) and (6) to (8) present results for sub-periods corresponding to pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods respectively. 
Size effect is controlled by a set of dummy variables for domestic market capitalization deciles. All regressions include industry (ICB sector-level) and year fixed effect. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at firm-level and showed in parentheses. p-value *<5% **<1% ***<0.1% 
 Forward earnings-price Trailing earnings-price 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 2002-16 2002-06 2007-09 2010-16 2002-16 2002-06 2007-09 2010-16 
Constant 0.008 0.021 0.036 0.014 -0.181*** -0.159*** -0.121*** -0.124*** 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.024) (0.033) (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) (0.034)    
Technology 0.060*** 0.038* 0.067*** 0.064*** 0.051*** 0.040 0.004 0.060*** 
 (0.008) (0.017) (0.014) (0.009) (0.010) (0.020) (0.034) (0.010)    
Telecommunications 0.115*** 0.178*** 0.077* 0.101*** 0.117*** 0.170*** 0.089** 0.115*** 
 (0.014) (0.036) (0.032) (0.016) (0.021) (0.048) (0.028) (0.032)    
Health Care 0.156*** 0.242*** 0.249*** 0.120*** 0.164*** 0.242*** 0.281*** 0.126*** 
 (0.012) (0.039) (0.031) (0.010) (0.014) (0.040) (0.049) (0.011)    
Financials 0.051*** 0.079*** 0.056 0.035*** 0.047*** 0.034 0.083** 0.039*** 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.030) (0.007) (0.011) (0.030) (0.027) (0.007)    
Real Estate 0.077* 0.079*** 0.273*** 0.086 0.104* 0.107*** 0.477*** 0.101    
 (0.034) (0.012) (0.030) (0.053) (0.043) (0.018) (0.036) (0.068)    
Consumer Discretionary 0.042*** 0.086*** 0.032** 0.021** 0.051*** 0.090*** 0.050* 0.028**  
 (0.006) (0.016) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.017) (0.020) (0.010)    
Consumer Staples 0.026** 0.046** 0.006 0.026* 0.026* 0.037 0.027 0.027    
 (0.008) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.010) (0.019) (0.026) (0.015)    
Industrials 0.049*** 0.110*** 0.025 0.036*** 0.029** 0.111*** 0.008 0.009    
 (0.007) (0.017) (0.014) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.021) (0.017)    
Basic Materials 0.075*** 0.107*** 0.031 0.076*** 0.095*** 0.144*** 0.036 0.097*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.020) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.026) (0.022)    
Energy 0.338 0.085** 0.035** 0.526 0.266 0.083*** 0.069*** 0.394    
 (0.263) (0.027) (0.012) (0.421) (0.157) (0.021) (0.015) (0.250)    
Utilities 0.067*** 0.098*** 0.017 0.068*** 0.063*** 0.105*** 0.008 0.057*** 
 (0.010) (0.021) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.024) (0.015) (0.016)    
Adj. R2 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.008 0.014 0.016 0.007    




Estimation of the Korea discount with country factors (trailing EP) 
 
 
Appendix 6 provides results for estimation of the Korea discount (based on forward trailing ratio) including control for country-
level corporate governance and financial development. To have comparable sample, we delete observations with missing data. 
The final sample covers period 2006-2015 and exclude Taiwan and Sweden. Column (1) provide results without corporate 
governance and financial development for comparison purpose. Column (2) shows results for models including control for 
legal origin. Columns (3) and (4) show results for model including control for minority investor protection proxies provided 
by World Bank and World Economic Forum. The minority investor protection score provided by the World Bank is part of the 
Doing business report and ranges from 0 to 100. The protection of minority shareholder is part of the 1st pillar (institution) of 
the Global Competitiveness Report published by the WEF and ranges between 1 and 7 (best). Column (5) shows results for 
models including the market capitalization of domestic firms as percentage of the GDP (provided by WB). Column (6) shows 
results for models including financial market development score provided by WEF. The financial market development is the 
8th pillar of the Global Competitiveness Score and ranges between 1 and 7. In panel A, Korea discount is estimated by industry 
portfolio approach. The dependent variable is trailing price-earnings ratio Industry-country portfolio PE are winsorized at 1 
and 99 percent level. All regressions include industry (ICB industry-level) and year fixed effect. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at country-level. In panel B, the Korea discount is estimated by individual stocks approach. The dependent variable 
is trailing earnings-to-price ratio. Size effect is controlled by a set of dummy variables for domestic market capitalization 
deciles. All regressions include industry (ICB sector-level) and year fixed effect. Robust standard errors are clustered at firm-
level and showed in parentheses. p-value *<5% **<1% ***<0.1% 










Market size Financial 
market dev. 
(WEF) 
Panel A: Industry portfolio approach  
Constant 20.614*** 20.472*** 20.802*** 24.629*** 20.916*** 23.595*** 
 (1.611) (1.645) (1.976) (3.252) (1.655) (3.263) 
Korea -2.586*** -2.275 -2.596*** -3.339*** -2.687*** -3.042*** 
 (0.453) (1.574) (0.442) (0.804) (0.473) (0.708) 
German  -0.158     
  (1.721)     
French  0.523     
  (0.804)     
Investor 
protection   -0.003 -0.751   
   (0.020) (0.626)   
Market size     -0.002*  
     (0.001)  
Financial 
market 
development       -0.569 
      (0.526) 
Observations 2613 2613 2613 2613 2613 2613 
Adjusted R-





Appendix 6 (ctd) 
Panel B: Individual stock approach 
Constant -0.108*** -0.112*** -0.071* -0.101 -0.119*** -0.143* 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.101) (0.027) (0.071) 
Korea 0.051*** 0.041*** 0.048*** 0.049* 0.057*** 0.057*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.020) (0.007) (0.013) 
German  0.013**     
  (0.005)     
French  -0.001     
  (0.018)     
Investor 
protection   -0.001** -0.001   
   (0.000) (0.015)   
Market size     0.000***  
     (0.000)  
Financial 
market 
development       0.006 
      (0.011) 
Observations 99656 99656 99656 99656 99656 99656 
Adjusted R-




Estimates of the chaebol and non-chaebol Korea discounts (trailing EP) 
 
 
Appendix 7 presents results for models including indicator for chaebol and non-chaebol firms based on trailing earnings. Chaebol 
indicator takes value 1 for firms affiliated to one of the top 30 chaebols based on KFTC classification. Non-chaebol indicator takes 
value 1 for Korean firms that are not affiliated to a top 30 chaebols. Columns (1) presents results for the full sample length. Columns 
(2), (3), and (4) present results for pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods respectively. Panel A presents result for industry portfolio 
approach and dependent variable is trailing price-earnings. Portfolio for financial (ICB 30), real estate (ICB 35), energy (ICB 60), 
and utilities (ICB 65) are excluded due to low number of Korean firms. Industry-country portfolio PE are winsorized at 1 and 99 
percent level. All regressions include industry (ICB industry-level) and year fixed effect. Robust standard errors are clustered at 
country-level and showed in parentheses. Panel B presents results for individual stocks approach and dependent variable is trailing 
earnings-to-price. Panel C presents results for individual stocks approach including interaction between Korea and chaebol indicator. 
Individual stocks approach models (panel B and C) include control for size based on a set of dummy variables for domestic market 
capitalization deciles. All regressions include industry (ICB sector-level) and year fixed effect. Robust standard errors are clustered 
at firm-level and showed in parentheses. p-value *<5% **<1% ***<0.1% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 2002-16 2002-06 2007-09 2010-16 
Panel A: Industry portfolio approach  
Constant 17.93*** 18.19*** 20.27*** 18.33*** 
 (2.311) (2.428) (3.059) (1.471) 
Chaebol -1.70*** -3.75*** -4.46*** -0.56 
 (0.448) (0.806) (1.167) (0.481) 
Non-chaebol -2.62*** -5.40*** -4.95*** -0.35 
 (0.474) (0.863) (1.245) (0.517) 
Observations 2933 953 390 1392 
Adjusted R-squared 0.056 0.042 0.096 0.058 
Panel B: Individual stock approach 
Constant -0.182*** -0.159*** -0.122*** -0.124*** 
 (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) (0.033) 
Chaebol 0.006 0.072*** -0.015 -0.013 
 (0.008) (0.017) (0.013) (0.010) 
Non-chaebol 0.086*** 0.105*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008) 
Observations 162495 48088 32879 81528 
Adjusted R-squared 0.008 0.014 0.016 0.007 
Panel C: Individual stock approach with interaction 
Constant -0.18*** -0.16*** -0.12*** -0.12***  
(0.023) (0.027) (0.027) (0.033)    
Korea 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.08*** 0.08***  
(0.006) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008)    
Korea*Chaebol -0.08*** -0.03 -0.09*** -0.09***  
(0.009) (0.018) (0.019) (0.012)    
Observations 162495 48088 32879 81528    
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Abstract
Finance practitioners frequently claim that stocks of Korean firms are undervalued and trade at a discount relative 
to foreign firms. This phenomenon is commonly called «the Korea discount». It is based on anecdotal evidence 
comparing either the price-earnings ratios of different market indexes or those of different individual stocks. This paper 
provides empirical evidence on the existence of such a discount using a large sample of stocks from 28 countries 
over the period 2002-2016. We find that Korean stocks have significantly lower price-earnings ratios than their global 
peers. We also investigate the role of large business groups called chaebols, which are often considered to be the 
main cause of the discount because of their poor corporate governance. Our findings show that it is not the case.
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